

Musical Knowledge and Musical Bildung – Some Reflections on a Difficult Relation

Jürgen Vogt

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article is to explore the relation of musical knowledge and musical Bildung. It's main theses are (a) that musical Bildung manifests itself as a combination of various kinds of knowledge from its historical beginning and that (b) a certain kind of "transformational knowledge" can be considered as its main characteristic today. First, the identity of musical knowledge and musical Bildung has to be rejected, because the idea of Bildung implies that knowledge is in some way important and relevant for the educated person. As the "neo-Aristotelian" philosophers of music education have pointed out, musical knowing-that and musical knowing-how have to be embedded in a social context, in order to become relevant for any given person. Musical Bildung, however, differs from this "praxial" approach, too. Traditionally, it implies the formation of the inner-self, mainly based on the aesthetics of emotions and the aesthetics of the sublime, embodied in the great musical work of art. During the 19th century, musical Bildung as cultural capital became a class marker, too, but it has always been an individual style of living as well. After the decline of the traditional idea of Bildung, some elements of this style of living have survived and have changed. In addition to musical knowing-that, technical knowing-how and situational knowing-when etc., post-modern Bildung requires a reflective knowledge and, most of all, a transformational knowledge at that. Following the last texts of Michel Foucault, musical Bildung could be considered as a mainly aesthetic kind of self-transformation within the medium of music, rather than a passive formation of the self by and through music. Keywords: musical Bildung, musical knowledge, transformation, Foucault.

"I don't feel that it is necessary to know exactly what I am. The main interest in life and work is to become someone else that you were not in the beginning"
(Michel Foucault, in: Martin et al. 1988: 9)

The purpose of the following essay is to discuss the relation between the German concept of musical Bildung¹ and musical knowledge. Although it seems to be obvious that both, Bildung and knowledge belong together in some way or another, it is notoriously difficult to define in which way they actually do.

In this article, I will try to develop the following theses: Musical Bildung has always consisted and still consists of a complex combination of different kinds or forms of musical knowledge. In the course of history, however, this combination has changed significantly; it is not a static one. I will try to make plausible, that this change can be described as a shift from the "formation of the self" by and through music in modern (traditional) concepts of musical Bildung to post-modern or present ideas of "self-transformation" within the medium of music. The article will have the following outline: I will start with some very basic considerations concerning musical knowledge and education. I will very shortly mention some well-known north-American colleagues at this point, because there is a certain convergence between some parts of the north-American Philosophy of Music Education and the "continental" concept of Bildung, which should not be ignored. After that, I will discuss the modern 19th century-concept of musical Bildung and its relation to musical knowledge. I would like to demonstrate the dialectics of this concept, which is, on the one hand, a historical expression of certain class-interests – which may be described with the help of Bourdieu and others -, but on the other hand still remains the basis for every post-modern or contemporary concept of musical Bildung. Finally, I intend to indicate, why and how musical Bildung today may be considered as a complex combination of different kinds of musical knowledge, with a characteristic emphasis on what I call "transformational knowledge".

Bildung as Knowledge

I will start with a rather simplistic assumption, which, however, may be useful in order to introduce some basic ideas and terms of this article. According to this assumption, Bildung is the same as knowledge, and the more knowledge someone acquires about

1 For a general introduction to the concept of (musical) Bildung, especially for an international readership, see Varkø, 2010.

music, the more educated he, or she is musically. This approach could be called the *encyclopedic* concept of Bildung and its ideal is the winner of game shows like “Who wants to be a millionaire?”. Game shows like that, however, illustrate the absurdity of this approach: According to the encyclopedic understanding of Bildung, it does not matter at all what you know, as long as you know enough about anything to win the game.

In some way, the encyclopedic knowledge is not even knowledge at all, but mere “information”. In contrast, knowledge can be defined as “information plus meaning” (see Liessmann, 2008: 27f.). I may know that Mozart was born in 1756 and that he was born in Salzburg, but without any kind of understanding why this might be important to know, this fact remains just a piece of information, which I most likely will forget at once. As Wolfgang Klafki, Germany’s most prominent theorist of Didactics and Bildung, has pointed out several decades ago, the equation of Bildung and knowledge ignores, among other things, the specific questions, which children and pupils have, as well as the specific view, which they have on the world. In contexts of Bildung, knowledge is not simply knowledge of something, but it always has to be meaningful and relevant for the person who acquires this knowledge (Klafki, 1975: 28ff.). Of course, this ought to be a pedagogical commonplace, but it could be considered as a reminder that not every kind of knowledge is worth having, simply because it exists.

Seen from this perspective, even the so-called “praxial” philosophy of music education, as it has been prominently exposed in David Elliott’s *Music Matters* from 1995, suffers from this encyclopedic shortcoming. Elliott takes great pains in demonstrating that Bennett Reimer’s “aesthetic” approach to Music Education is insufficient and misleading, and one of his main arguments is that making music, or “musicing”, is not just doing something, but doing it “thoughtfully and knowingly” (Elliott, 1995: 55). Therefore, musicing requires different forms of knowledge, and, if we follow Elliott here, the so-called “formal knowledge”, the “knowing that (something is the case)”, is even the least important of them (ibid.: 62).

In contrast, the different forms of musical “knowing how” are considered as the primary goals of Music Education: it is necessary to acquire what Elliott calls “informal knowledge”, “impressionistic knowledge” and “supervisory knowledge” in order to reach the highest level of musicianship (ibid. 54). Without going into any details here², I actually do think that Elliott has made an important point, advocating the various forms of “knowing how” as real musical knowledge. On the other hand, the “praxial” approach has, as it were, an “encyclopedic” problem as well: Given, that all kinds of

2 There are a number of problems which could be discussed in this context, but which lie outside the scope of this article, e.g. if the different kinds of knowledge should be added (like Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences suggests) or if they could be reduced to one basic kind of knowledge (knowing-that to knowing-how or vice versa).

procedural musical knowledge exist – which kinds of them should be acquired and how many of them? What makes them meaningful and important for children or pupils? Obviously, the pure addition of musical knowledge does not automatically lead to something like musical Bildung, even in the vaguest sense of the word, as long as there is a normative gap between the What and the Why of acquiring musical knowledge in all its forms.

Other authors like Regelski (e.g. Regelski, 1998) and Bowman (e.g. Bowman, 2002) have seen this problem somewhat clearer than Elliott did himself (see Elliott, 1995: 269ff.)³. In order to solve it (and to fill this normative gap), they have suggested to remember a traditional distinction, which was introduced by Greek philosopher Aristotle. In their, as it were, “neo-Aristotelian” approach they have insisted on one important difference within the field of practical knowledge itself, and this is the distinction between “techne” (*téchne*) and “phronesis” (*phronēsis*). “Techne” could be translated as “skill” or “technical knowledge”, whereas “phronesis” means something like “practical knowledge”, which is mainly a social ability. Seen from this Aristotelian perspective, most of the things Elliott describes as musical “knowing-how” can be characterized as mere “techne” or musical skill, quite necessary and important of course, but normatively indifferent – you may, for example, acquire these skills in any imaginable society, democratic or not.

Contrary to this, the practical knowledge, which Aristotle calls “phronesis”, refers to life in a given community and includes an ethical dimension as well. Therefore, if practical musical knowledge is more than just technical knowledge in the Aristotelian sense of the word, it should be better called “music-related knowledge”, because then, music is always more than just music as a sound-object or a sound-event. Music-related knowledge takes into account that music is always the practice of individuals and of social groups and does not exist without considering the normative standards of these individuals and groups. Or, as Wayne Bowman has recently put it, “the ethically oriented domain of [music, JV] education (...) extends well beyond technical concerns, implicating questions like when-to, whether-to, to-whom-to, or to-what-extent-to. If music is to be a required feature in everyone’s education, its contribution to non-technical abilities like these should be the basis for its claim” (Bowman, 2012: 33).

This is, as far as I can see, the closest convergence of recent north-American discussions of the “goods” of Music Education and the concept of musical Bildung. Musical knowing-that, the technical knowing-how and the practical knowing-when etc. are indispensable for any concept of musical Bildung, too, but it is quite impossible to

3 In the new edition of *Music Matters* from 2014 Elliott has reacted to this problem and has included e.g. a kind of „ethical knowledge“ (see Elliott & Silverman 2014, 195ff.).

describe musical Bildung merely in terms of the praxial or neo-Aristotelian approach. For the better or the worse, the philosophical ancestor of Bildung is not Aristotle but Plato, the roots of Bildung are religious and not political (see e.g. Meyer-Drawe 1999), and the concept of Bildung is strongly connected with a special social class at a certain historical moment. Therefore, we will have to look somewhat closer at the rise of the idea of Bildung in 18th and 19th century Germany.

The modern idea of musical Bildung as formation of the self

The modern theory of Bildung – which, in contrast to its post-modern successor, can be called the traditional theory as well – had a clear and rather simple answer to the question of what you need to know in order to be musically educated: Someone is musically educated if he or she knows important musical works of art. For numerous reasons, however, this answer has lost its plausibility during the recent decades. There are several rather well known causes for this decline of this concept of Bildung, but I will concentrate here on some reasons why and how this idea was originally established and what “to know musical works of art” really means in this context⁴.

A glance at the history of musical Bildung shows that from its beginning, musical Bildung is closely linked to the aesthetics of emotion and remains to be so during the whole 19th and large parts of the 20th century⁵. The first modern theorists of musical Bildung are to be found within the context of pedagogical philanthropy in the age of enlightenment. Regardless of all individual differences, the philanthropists generally insisted on the idea that music has an immediate effect on people who listen to it, especially young children, and this effect is mainly emotional. Within the first theories of musical Bildung, Bildung is more or less a passive event. Here we find the original meaning of Bildung as formation, which is platonic in its origins: Music forms human beings, and this is only possible because there is a certain congruence of musical and human qualities, especially in terms of emotion.

In the beginning, this platonic idea of formation by and through music had nothing to do with ambitious musical works of art. Songs were preferred to instrumental music, because instrumental music was considered an inferior mode of music due to its semantic ambiguity. Especially for pedagogical intentions, the mixture of music and text appeared to be much more useful, because it combined the emotional effect

4 This historical complex has been thoroughly analyzed. I refer especially to Bollenbeck, 1996 and Reckwitz 2006, without documenting this in detail here.

5 For a more detailed account see Vogt, 2012, 2012a, 2013

of the music with the content of the text. It goes without saying that not every kind of music and definitely not every kind of song was considered as appropriate and suitable for the formation of human beings (especially for the common people). The music had to be simple and positive, the words pious or at least honorable. We can see here the early intimate connection between Bildung and morals. Bildung is the project of the new German middle classes – the “Bürgertum” – , who insist on the essential difference between them and the old aristocracy. The aristocracy is considered as being superficial, lazy, and morally deficient, whereas the new middle classes define themselves as just the contrary: deep and earnest, hardworking and useful, pious and honorable, honest and truly emotional. That is why Bildung is, above all, the formation of the inner self and not of outward behavior or manners⁶.

The formation of the inner self by listening to music, however, does not require any specific knowledge at all. You need not to know anything about music (knowing-that) in order to be emotionally moved. It is not necessary either to have any kind of practical knowledge (knowing-how) like playing an instrument, although especially singing as some kind of immediate expression of emotions (or the inner self) was pedagogically preferred for children until the middle of the 20th century.

During the first decades of the 19th century, this philanthropic concept of musical Bildung changes significantly. The aesthetics of emotions remains important, even if some authors like Eduard Hanslick detested it, but in the course of time, it was eclipsed by the aesthetics of the sublime. For romantic theorists, music turns into the paradigm for the aesthetics of the sublime, because it could be considered as a manifestation of something, which cannot be expressed with words, because it is more than just words. Music without text, which used to be a deficient aesthetic mode before, now becomes the synonym for music itself, but only great and ambitious compositions, like for example Beethoven’s 5th symphony, prove to be really sublime and truer than truth⁷.

According to the late German musicologist Carl Dahlhaus, this should have been the historical moment for musical knowledge as musical Bildung, because these sublime compositions and musical works of art require theoretical and analytical musical knowledge in order to understand them properly (Dahlhaus, 1990). To Dahlhaus’ disappointment, however, this was obviously not the case. The musically educated person has never been somebody with expert or near-expert knowledge about music⁸, and music did not enter the German curricula as a real school-subject until the late 20th century. Still, this is not hard to explain. If people are formed by and through

6 For the intimate connection between Bildung and Protestantism see Timm, 1990

7 Still important, although certainly much too one-sided: Dahlhaus, 1989 (1979)

8 For the difference between the musical expert (musicologist) and the musical nonprofessional, see Hentschel, 2006.

listening to music, there is not an essential difference between listening to the simple philanthropic songs and listening to great musical works of art. However, there is one important difference and this is the missing of the moral aspect, which was crucial for the philanthropic idea of musical Bildung. Listening to Beethoven does not make you a morally better person, although some people might claim this until today. Nevertheless, perhaps, you will not be the same person after listening to Beethoven, which is much more likely, but not guaranteed. The very purposeful moral formation of the self, which can be organized and planned by educators, gradually changes to a transformation of the self, which becomes a risky enterprise, because you can never know, if and in which way this transformation actually happens.

Apart from this shift within the concept itself, musical Bildung remains nevertheless in its core a formation of the inner self. This restriction causes quite a few problems, if you want to communicate Bildung within a social context: you certainly need a proof or at least a hint that someone is musically educated at all – how do you ever know? With the rise and the establishment of the German middle classes during the 19th century the importance of this demand grew steadily, because “Bildung” became perhaps the most important mark of a certain class membership. The rather strange German word “Bildungsbürger” belongs in this context, and there we have another compound which can hardly be translated (see Engelhardt 1986). The inseparable connection of “Bildung” and “Bürger” (citizen) suggests that “Bildung” is not only a certain qualification or a certain amount of knowledge. Moreover, “Bildung” characterizes a certain way of life or a style of living (see Lepsius 1992): You should actually be able to see that someone belongs to the middle classes, because he is educated, and vice versa.

There are some hints, which everybody should keep in mind, in order to identify the Bildung of the “Bildungsbürger”. It is characteristic for the traditional idea of Bildung, that it is focused on the knowledge of the arts, combined perhaps with the knowledge of Latin, Greek or History. As an educated citizen you will have to know something about art (including music), but this knowledge is certainly not the knowledge of the expert. The educated citizen and the educated expert know different things about art. The expert usually is a professional in his field, but you do not make your living with Bildung; Bildung is by definition useless for professional or other purposes.

Therefore, the knowledge of the educated citizen is a fragile construction: You have to know something about music, for example, but you are not allowed to know as much or the same things as the musicologist. If “Bildung” is a mark for social class affiliation in the first place, you will need to have a kind of knowledge, which enables other people to recognize you as educated. It is the obvious thing to do to describe this kind of knowledge with Pierre Bourdieu as a kind of cultural (and/or social) capital: A certain kind of knowledge, mainly about art, helps to distinguish the Middle Classes

from the Lower Classes, and it also helps to distinguish the Upper Middle Classes from the Lower Middle Classes. This is the point, when the so-called “Halbbildung” enters the stage (see Adorno, 1959). The “semi-educated” person does not simply know 50% of the real-educated one. Instead, he or she merely appears to be educated by showing a superficial acquaintance with the objects of Bildung. Bildung, then, degenerates to a mere marker of social class affiliation (cf. Schwanitz, 1999).

Bildung transformed

It does not follow, however, that this social function is the only function of Bildung – a mistake, which Bourdieu and others have made and make until today (see e.g. Shusterman, 2002). I would like to call this the “sociological fallacy”, because Bildung has always been more and always been different from its mere social use⁹. I would like to bring to mind again the most important characteristics of musical Bildung, as it has developed during the 19th century.

First, musical Bildung was closely linked to musical works of art. Of course, this had to do with the representational function of the great concert or the great opera. However, the musical works of art offered certain aesthetic qualities, which enabled a new way of listening. The self-referential musical work of art (“absolute music”) requires and enables an equally self-referential reception (listening for listening’s sake), which has nothing to do with those religious or moral functions, which music had before as a part of philanthropic Bildung. Listening to music in this way establishes musical Bildung as a counterpart to all practical requirements of daily life. Especially musical Bildung exemplifies the “uselessness” of Bildung as a whole, which, by the way, makes it suspicious for all utilitarian school curriculums of all kinds (see e.g. Varkøy, 2010).

Second, the musical works of art are still received emotionally. At least within the field of art people are allowed to be emotional and aesthetically sensitive.

Third, the aesthetics of the sublime implies that the musical object as the “content” of Bildung is something, which is beyond the normal cognitive understanding, which

9 In the words of German historian Reinhart Koselleck: „Kein bestimmtes Wissen und keine einzelne Wissenschaft, keine politische Haltung oder soziale Vorgabe, kein konfessionelles Bekenntnis und keine religiöse Bindung, keine weltanschauliche Option oder philosophische Präferenz, auch keine spezifische ästhetische Neigung in Kunst und Literatur reichen hin, um ‚Bildung‘ zu kennzeichnen. Bildung ist im Hinblick auf alle konkreten Bestimmungen in der Lebenswelt ein Metabegriff, der die empirischen Bedingungen seiner eigenen Ermöglichung ständig in sich einholt. Bildung läßt sich nicht über bestimmte Bildungsgüter oder konkretes Bildungswissen hinreichend definieren. Wenn es gleichwohl gemeinsame, idealtypische Grundzüge gibt, so sind sie in jener Lebensführung enthalten, die immer auf dem Weg ist auf dem Weg der Selbstfindung“ (Koselleck, 1990: 23–24).

is bigger than you are and which has an overwhelming effect. If you expose yourself to the experience of the sublime, you will never be the same person as you used to be before.

Fourth, the experience you make while listening to a sublime musical work of art, is fundamentally a passive one, although the act of listening has active elements as well. Experience may be something you make, but at the same time, it is made with you. This is why, this kind of Bildung is unpredictable in its results; you never know what this piece of music will make with you – perhaps nothing, perhaps a lot.

Fifth, the reception of musical works of art is a highly individualistic enterprise. The listening subject establishes a relation to him- or herself, which cannot be realized within work, communication or other social activities.

Finally, Bildung in general has been established not as a mere accumulation of knowledge or as a certain certificate or qualification. “Bildungswissen”, as the German philosopher Max Scheler called it, is a knowledge, which helps you to establish a style of living or even, emphatically speaking, a way of being in the world (Scheler, 1976/1925).

Perhaps to the disappointment of musicologists, the role of theoretical knowledge about music (knowing-that) is rather small within this concept. Nevertheless, the listening, individualistic, emotionally sensitive, and self-styled subject indeed has to know quite a lot about music. However, this knowledge is a practical knowledge, a knowing-how, in the first place – a practical knowledge, which has nothing to do with the musician’s technical knowing-how. People have to be able to choose and find music (or musics), persons, places, situations or occasions which provide the opportunity to make those musical (emotional, sublime, and sensitive) experiences he or she is looking for. In order to do so, however, you need another kind of knowing-that, a “self-related” or “reflective knowledge”, because at least an implicit knowledge of yourself, of your desires, your needs, your wants, is essential in order to find those opportunities for musical experience. Moreover, the musically educated person needs some kind of “transformational knowledge”, which is necessary, if all these musical experiences shall contribute to a change of the way somebody sees or better: hears the world.

Overall, even the traditional notion of musical Bildung contains rather different kinds of knowledge, which I will try to summarize.

First of all, there is the musical *knowing-that*, which may be also called material knowledge or propositional knowledge.

Second, there is the *technical knowing-how* (musical knowing-how no.1). Both propositional and technical knowledge, like playing an instrument, singing or dancing, play a surprisingly minor role in the traditional idea of musical Bildung, mainly because its connection with the aesthetic paradigms of emotion, listening and the sublime.

Third, there is the *situational knowledge* (musical knowing-how no.2). Here we find not only the technical how-to, but also, in Wayne Bowman's words, the when-to, whether-to, to-whom-to or to-what-extent-to (with-whom-to). It is the Aristotelian idea of "phronesis", the practical knowledge, which tells us if our actions are adequate within a certain context, at a given time in a given situation together with other persons.

Fourth, we need some kind of *reflective musical knowledge*. In a way, this is a kind of knowing-that, but this knowledge may well remain unconscious. I may know, for example, that I have heard a certain kind of music before and that I liked it a lot. However, I have to know, too, if I really want to hear it again or if I would like another kind of music better.

Fifth, and last, there is the *transformational musical knowledge*. The transformational knowledge is a kind of knowing-how: I have to know how to find music(s), musical practices, other people, situations, or occasions, which may be important for a possible change in my style of life. There is no guarantee for that, of course, but I may be increasing my chances to become a different person than I have been before¹⁰.

As we can see, even the traditional idea of Bildung implies a rather complex combination of different forms of musical or music-related knowledge¹¹. Yet, the traditional musical Bildung does not exist any more as it existed until, roughly speaking, the 1920ies, or 1930ies. Its components, however, have not disappeared completely but have undergone a complex change and shift of emphasize¹². Two changes seem to be most important in this context: First, traditional musical Bildung always had a moral frame and a moral aim, although the Romantic Movement untied this connection between art and morals significantly. Post-modern musical Bildung still is mainly an enterprise of the inner self, but the inner self is not formed any more within a moral framework; it is formed, if one can say so, within a general aesthetic framework.

Second, in post-modern musical Bildung the active component has gained more importance than before: Listening for listening's sake is still important, but other, active, and experimental uses of music, combined with bodily experiences and the use of technical media have expanded the field of relevant musical experiences significantly.

To put it in a single and rather over-simplified formula, the post-modern idea of musical Bildung can be understood as an (primarily active) act of aesthetic self-styling

10 The transformational aspect of Bildung in general has been developed especially by Koller, 2012

11 There is a certain parallel between this list and Hermann J. Kaiser's analysis of musical experience (Kaiser, 1992). According to Kaiser, you need to have knowledge about music, about the relation between you and the music, and about the social situations, in which musical experiences are made or will be made (ibid.: 171). The transformational knowledge is missing, probably because Kaiser's concept of experience implies a rational control about personal experiences, which has no or little room for unexpected or experimental experiences. Experience is not the same as Bildung.

12 I follow Reckwitz 2006 in this respect (especially chapter 4.2.3.), who himself relates to authors like Foucault, Taylor, Bourdieu and others.

within the medium of music or better: within the context of diverse musical practices. This act requires different forms of musical knowledge: material, technical, situational, reflective, and transformational. It can be considered as typical for post-modern musical Bildung, that these forms of knowledge are controlled neither by moral standards nor by the tradition of the great musical works of art. The only standard or criterion is the one which is defined by individual personal transformation and not, for example, by social norms of respectability.

If this is true, however, it is even more difficult to combine musical Bildung with music education in schools, than it has ever been before. It is possible, of course, to teach the knowing-that of material knowledge. It is possible as well, to teach the technical knowledge you might need for playing an instrument or for singing or working with the computer. It is much more difficult, however, to teach practical musical knowledge. You have to practice this kind of knowledge within a social context, in order to find out, how to act musically in an adequate and acceptable way. Even more difficult than that is the teaching of reflective musical knowledge. Reflective knowledge may be a kind of knowing-that, but if anybody knows about the intimate relation between a person and various kinds of music, it is certainly not the teacher, but only the pupil him- or herself. The only thing the teacher can do is to help to make this relation more conscious than it was before, but he cannot actually teach how to do this. At last, transformational knowledge cannot be taught at all, because even the pupil himself does not know, what and when he or she may require in order to be transformed by musical experience. However, transformational knowledge is certainly a kind of knowing-how, and therefore it requires a certain amount of practice, but a practice of what?

In his last writings, French philosopher Michel Foucault has developed the provoking idea, that transformational knowledge as a knowing-how could even be considered as a technical knowledge, a “technology of the self” (see Martin et al. 1988; Foucault 2005). Foucault, as many others before, got this idea from studying ancient authors, but he re-discovered mainly the roman stoics and not Plato or Aristotle. Whether Foucault’s interpretation of those authors has been correct or one-sided is not particularly important here and now. The interesting philosophical point which Foucault makes here, is that the self should not be considered as a pre-formed entity, which simply needs to be discovered or to be developed, which the traditional concept of Bildung has always presupposed. In this view, the self simply does not exist, as long as it does not perform certain acts, by which it is constituted. If this is true, then self-formation and self-transformation are performative acts, which have a close resemblance to creative acts. This is why Foucault’s speaks about an “aesthetics of existence”, which requires certain more or less “aesthetic” techniques of the self.

If we consider this “performative” idea for a very short moment, it could be possible that each musical practice could be a potentially transforming activity, depending on the style, or the manner, or the spirit in which you perform it (see Menke, 2003). If you practice a scale on an instrument, for example, it may be a mere technical drill, which simply enlarges your technical musical knowledge, with a certain aim and the possibility to test, whether you have succeeded or not. This is, of course, not a bad thing to do in itself. Still, you may practice the same scale without a given aim, as an experimental exploration of sound, not knowing, which results may emerge from this. In both cases, the actual result may even be the same, but in the second case, the practice of a scale may become an aesthetic practice of life, a practice to become somebody different¹³. If this is true, then every kind or form of musical knowledge may contribute to musical Bildung, as long as it is part of an experimental, transformational way to become somebody different. Therefore, musical Bildung requires many, and many different forms of musical knowledge, but it is the style or the attitude, in which these forms of knowledge contribute to musical action, which decides, whether musical knowledge belongs to Bildung, or whether it does not¹⁴.

References

- Adorno, T. W. (1972/1959). Theorie der Halbbildung. In: T. W. Adorno *Gesammelte Schriften. Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I*, 93–121.
- Bollenbeck, G. (1996). *Bildung und Kultur: Glanz und Elend eines deutschen Deutungsmusters*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Bowman, W. (2002). Educating Musically. In: R. Colwell & C. Richardson (Eds.). *The New Handbook of Research on Music Teaching and Learning: A Project of the Music Educators National Conference* (63–84). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bowman, W. (2012). Music’s Place in Education. In: G. E. McPherson & G. F. Welch (Eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Music Education* (21–39), Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dahlhaus, C. (1989/1978). *The Idea of Absolute Music*. Translated by Roger Lustig. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

13 In a very general sense, without referring to Foucault, U. Mählert (2006) discusses the possibility of practice-as-Bildung.

14 It is understood, that there many basic problems arising from this idea: If nobody is able to judge the difference between drill and aesthetic practice from the outside – does the individual really know the difference him- or herself? This problem cannot be discussed here; see e.g. Mayer & Thompson, 2013.

- Dahlhaus, C. (1990). Das deutsche Bildungsbürgertum und die Musik. In: R. Koselleck (Ed.) *Bildungsgüter und Bildungswissen* (220–236). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- Elliott, D. J. (1995). *Music Matters. A New Philosophy of Music Education*. New York et al.: Oxford University Press.
- Elliott, D. J. & Silverman, M. (2014): *Music Matters. A Philosophy of Music Education* (2nd edition). New York et al.: Oxford University Press.
- Engelhardt, U. (1986). „Bildungsbürgertum“: Begriffs- und Dogmengeschichte eines Etiketts. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- Foucault, M. (2005). *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*. Lectures at the Collège de France 1981–1982. New York: Picador.
- Hentschel, F. (2006). *Bürgerliche Ideologie und Musik. Politik der Musikgeschichtsschreibung in Deutschland 1776–1871*. Frankfurt & New York: Campus.
- Kaiser, H. J. (1993). Zur Entstehung und Erscheinungsform „Musikalischer Erfahrung“. In: H. J. Kaiser, E. Nolte & M. Roske (Eds.) *Vom pädagogischen Umgang mit Musik* (161–176). Mainz: Schott.
- Klafki, W. (1975/1963). *Studien zur Bildungstheorie und Didaktik*. Weinheim: Beltz.
- Koller, H.-C. (2012). *Bildung anders denken. Einführung in die Theorie transformativischer Bildungsprozesse*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
- Koselleck, R. (1990). Einleitung – Zur anthropologischen und semantischen Struktur von Bildung. In: R. Koselleck (Ed.) *Bildungsbürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert. Teil II: Bildungsgüter und Bildungswissen* (11–46). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- Lepsius, M. R. (1992): Das Bildungsbürgertum in ständischer Vergesellschaftung. In: M. R. Lepsius (Ed.) *Bildungsbürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert. Teil III: Lebensführung und ständische Vergesellschaftung* (8–18). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- Liessmann, K. P. (2008/2006). *Theorie der Unbildung. Die Irrtümer der Wissensgesellschaft*. München: Piper.
- Mahlert, U. (2006). Was ist Üben? Zur Klärung einer komplexen musikalischen Praxis. In: U. Mahlert (Ed.) *Handbuch Üben. Grundlagen, Konzepte, Methoden* (9–46). Wiesbaden: Breitkopf & Härtel.
- Martin, L. H.; Gutman, Huck & Hutton, Patrick H. (Eds.) (1988). *Technologies of the self: A seminar with Michel Foucault*. Amherst, Mass: Univ. of Massachusetts Press.
- Mayer, R. and Thompson, C. (2013). Inszenierung und Optimierung des Selbst. Eine Einführung. In: R. Mayer, C. Thompson & M. Wimmer *Inszenierung und Optimierung des Selbst. Zur Analyse gegenwärtiger Selbsttechnologien* (7–28). Wiesbaden: Springer.

- Menke, C. (2003). Zweierlei Übung: Zum Verhältnis von sozialer Disziplinierung und ästhetischer Existenz. In: A. Honneth & M. Saar (Eds.) *Michel Foucault: Zwischenbilanz einer Rezeption* (283–299). Frankfurt a. M. Suhrkamp.
- Meyer-Drawe, K. (1999). Zum metaphorischen Gehalt von „Bildung“ und „Erziehung“. *Zeitschrift für Pädagogik* (45), 161–75.
- Reckwitz, A. (2006). *Das hybride Subjekt: Eine Theorie der Subjektkulturen von der bürgerlichen Moderne zur Postmoderne*. Weilerswist: Velbrück.
- Regelski, T. A. (1998). The Aristotelian Bases of Praxis for Music and Music Education as Praxis. *Philosophy of Music Education Review* (1), 22–59.
- Scheler, M. (1976/1925). Die Formen des Wissens und der Bildung. In: M. S. Frings (Ed.) *Späte Schriften* (= Gesammelte Werke 9) (85–119). Bern & München: Francke.
- Shusterman, R. (2002). Cultural Analysis and the Limits of Philosophy: The Case of Bourdieu. In: R. Shusterman *Surface and Depth. Dialectics and Criticism of Culture*. Ithaca & London. Cornell University Press, 208–225.
- Schwanitz, D. (1999). *Bildung: Alles, was man wissen muss*. München: Goldmann
- Timm, H. (1990). Bildungsreligion im deutschsprachigen Protestantismus – eine grundbegriffliche Perspektivierung. In: R. Koselleck (Ed.) *Bildungsbürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert. Teil II: Bildungsgüter und Bildungswissen* (57–79). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- Varkøy, Ø. (2010). The Concept of “Bildung”. *Philosophy of Music Education Review* (1): 85–96.
- Vogt, J. (2012). Musikalische Bildung: Ein lexikalischer Versuch. *Zeitschrift für Kritische Musikpädagogik (ZfKM)*. <http://www.zfkm.org/12-vogt.pdf>.
- Vogt, J. (2012a). Musikpädagogik und Gefühl. Geschichte und Gegenwart eines problematischen Verhältnisses. In: (Ed.) M. Krause and L. Oberhaus, *Musik und Gefühl*. Hildesheim: Olms, 17–40.
- Vogt, J. (2013). Gefühle in musikalischer Bildung – eine Spurensuche. *Zeitschrift für Kritische Musikpädagogik (ZfKM)*. <http://www.zfkm.org/13-vogt2.pdf>

Prof. Dr. Jürgen Vogt
University of Hamburg
Department of Education
Von-Melle-Park 8
20146 Hamburg
Germany
juergen.vogt@uni-hamburg.de